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Andrej Babiš is not Central Europe’s 
Game-Changer by Milan Nič and Vít Dostál
The Czech election result seems worrying at first: Yet another populist leader has been 
catapulted into power in Central Europe. But billionaire Andrej Babiš and his populist 
ANO party, which received almost 30 percent of the vote, is not necessarily going to push 
the Czech Republic into an illiberal and anti-EU direction.
The Czech Republic has closely integrated trade and eco-
nomic relations and strong bilateral ties with neighboring 
Germany. So far, the country has been among the most 
pro-Western among the newer EU members. Parallels be-
tween Andrej Babiš and Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor 
Orbán or Polish leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski are overdone. 
Unlike Orbán and Kaczynski, 63-years-old Babiš is not an 
ideologue, but a pragmatic businessman. Babiš’s political 
position is far less dominant than that of his Hungarian 
and Polish counterparts. Unlike them, he is not a na-
tionalist. Furthermore, he will need to form a coalition 
government with one or two junior partners.
Babiš – weaker than his neighboring leaders
In his book “What I dream of when I happen to sleep,” 
broadly distributed as part of his election campaign, 
Babiš presents far-reaching suggestions for changing the 
Czech political system: dissolving the upper chamber 
of Parliament, halving the number of MPs in the lower 
chamber, changing electoral law from proportional and 
regional to majoritarian/single district representation. 
However, none of these ideas made it into his party’s pro-
gram and they would be hard to enact in any case: Even 
with the support of all other anti-establishment parties, 
the ANO would still lack a constitutional majority. Unlike 
in Poland or Hungary, the Czech Senate can effectively 
block any constitutional change and thereby stabilize the 
constitutional system.
Besides the strong position of Babiš’s ANO party – the 
acronym means “yes” in Czech –, the continued fragmen-
tation of the Czech political spectrum is one of the most 
important outcomes of this election, with as many as nine 
political parties in the new parliament (up from seven 
in the 2013 elections and from five in 2010). The collapse 
of the political center and the surge of the protest vote 
have benefited new parties. Among the winners are the 
anti-corruption, transparency-centered Pirates Party as 
well as the far-right party of half-Japanese MP Tomio 
Okamura, which received around 10 percent of the vote 
each. Forming a lasting coalition government will be no 
easy task for Babiš.
Political contradictions, conflicts of interests 
Babiš himself is a bundle of contradictions: A self-pro-
claimed anti-establishment leader and anti-corruption 
crusader, he profited from the ‘old system’ of mainstream 
parties, is the second-richest Czech businessman and a 
media mogul, and was until recently also the country’s fi-
nance minister. He raised expectations in Czech society to 
“govern more effectively” or, as his slogan puts it, “run the 
country as a family firm”, in order to fix “a corrupted sys-
tem”, as he called out frequently in his campaign. But be-
yond keeping fiscal discipline, ANO’s economic program 
remains vague. Although a continuing economic boom 
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and solid public finances will allow him to spend more on 
the neglected road system and other, also digital infra-
structure, and to distribute more social perks, he does not 
have any long-term political or economic strategy at this 
stage. He will need to rely on his media and marketing 
machine, apart from which he has no strong institutional, 
cultural, or social connection with his constituency or 
broader Czech society.
Another aspect to be aware of is that Babiš’s business 
imperium in the chemical, agricultural, and media sec-
tors spans several EU countries. Out of 250 companies in 
Babiš’s Agrofert holding, ten are based in Slovakia, four 
in Hungary, three in Germany, and one in Poland. As 
such, he faces many conflicts of interest which will likely 
constrain him in his new political role.
Possible Scenarios
Being Prime Minister will test Babiš’s political skills to 
build lasting alliances. His first challenge is to face off an 
ongoing criminal investigation for fraud, for which he 
has been formally charged. The majority of parties in the 
new parliament refuses to accept him as the new prime 
minister on these grounds. Babiš denies any wrongdoing 
and has dismissed the case as politically motivated. Cur-
rent President Miloš Zeman will nominate Babiš as Prime 
Minister. Three possible scenarios could then unfold: 
 . Restoration of the outgoing coalition with Social Demo-
crats and Christian Democrats.  
This option is less likely as both parties have ruled out 
forming a government with either a prime minister or a 
minister charged with fraud. The option would be con-
ceivable nonetheless if Babiš – “Kaczyński style” – were 
to let someone from his party or a technocrat become 
prime minister in his stead. He has so far rejected such 
a scenario. Both the Social Democrats and the Christian 
Democrats have emerged badly damaged from govern-
ing with Babiš. In the elections, he was able to attract 
many of their traditional voters, taking votes mainly 
from the formerly dominant Social Democrats. In re-
shuffling their respective leadership, both parties might 
turn out to be unpredictable partners.
 . Coalition with the liberal-conservative eurosceptic  
Civic Democratic Party (ODS). Although both parties 
have similar programs, the ODS appears divided on 
whether it considers a coalition with the ANO a pos-
sibility. Indeed, the party leadership has so far ruled 
out this option: Like the other two big parties, it rejects 
Babiš on the grounds of his fraud charge. 
 . Minority government with parliamentary support from 
Okamura’s far-right party and the Communist Party.  
In this scenario, Babiš would rely on unpredictable part-
ners. Such a step might cause intra-party rebellion and 
he could face international isolation. It is likely that he 
will want to avoid this scenario.
In face of the difficulties connected with each of these 
scenarios, coalition talks might last several months. Fur-
thermore, the presidential election is set to take place in 
January 2018, and Miloš Zeman is running for re-election 
in spite of his poor health. He is expected to play a larger 
role in the coalition talks than is envisaged for his mostly 
representative position. This is partly due to the fact that 
Zeman is focusing on voters of the ANO and of Okamura’s 
party and needs to avoid that they nominate their own 
candidates.
Czech foreign and EU policy to be continued
Czech foreign and EU policy under an ANO-led govern-
ment is likely to show a lot of continuity from Bohuslav 
Sobotka’s outgoing cabinet, of which Babiš’s party was a 
junior member. Given the fragmentation of the political 
spectrum in the Czech Republic and the reduced stability 
of the incoming government, the upcoming presidential 
election and ANO’s focus on domestic topics, Babiš’s 
European policy is bound to be reactive, pragmatic, non-
ideological, and very transactional.
The ANO will likely focus on domestic regulatory poli-
cies. The party’s foreign and European policy program 
is underdeveloped, and Babiš has little interest in pursu-
ing it proactively. While he values the single market and 
Schengen as key EU achievements to protect, his instinct 
is to maintain the status quo. With the exception of de-
fence politics, he does not want to deepen the EU further; 
all major democratic parties support the EU’s Permanent 
Structured Cooperation. 
With regard to migration, ANO’s new government can 
be expected to reject any refugee relocation mechanism 
and stress the need to protect Schengen borders – a con-
tinuation of current policies. 
Babiš will most probably oppose the EU reforms 
proposed by French President Emmanuel Macron. To 
Babiš, Macrons Sorbonne speech served as a warning 
that a French drive for deeper integration might split the 
EU even further and could lead to more Brexits. Babiš 
rejects both a multi-speed EU and the adoption of a single 
currency, and Prague will not enter the eurozone by 2025. 
As the current government in Prague has also not pushed 
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eurozone membership, his position in this regard does not 
reflect a U-turn in the Czech Republic’s EU policy.
Babiš’s eclectic approach to the current debate on 
the EU’s future discloses his extremely limited know-
ledge about how the union actually functions. His lack of 
familiarity is augmented by the ANO’s shortage of senior 
figures experienced in foreign and EU affairs. Pavel 
Telička, MEP and Vice President of the European Parlia-
ment, ended cooperation with the party just weeks before 
the elections due to his ongoing ideological conflicts 
with the party leader. Other qualified MEPs, such as Dita 
Charanzová and Martina Dlabajová, who worked in the 
European Parliament’s liberal-centrist ALDE group, might 
possibly be promoted. The same goes for Věra Jourová, 
EU Commissioner for Justice, who had served as ANO’s 
deputy party leader before moving to Brussels. It is likely 
that one of the junior coalition partners will be offered to 
nominate the new Czech Foreign Minister and thereby de-
termine the exact course of Czech EU and foreign policy. 
In all these scenarios NATO will certainly remain the 
cornerstone of Czech security policy, as Okamura’s party 
and the Communist Party – both anti-NATO parties – will 
almost certainly not be part of the government.
On the regional level and within the Visegrad Group, 
the Czech Republic is likely to keep its tandem with 
Slovakia. Unlike Poland or Hungary, Babiš has no stake in 
further confrontation with Brussels. It is to be expected 
therefore that Babiš will navigate his own path and look 
for new allies such as Austria’s Sebastian Kurz.
Czech-German relations
Czech-German relations were not an issue in the election: 
Most parties stressed the need for good relations and 
productive cooperation with Germany in their manifes-
tos. A possible area of tension in Czech-German relations 
might, however, be energy policy. Babiš is known not to 
support the climate change agenda and may oppose new 
limitations on the use of biofuels in transport due to his 
business interests. He is also critical about Germany’s 
‘Energiewende’, the transition to low-carbon energy sup-
plies and state support schemes for renewable energies. 
Meanwhile, the Czech position is likely to stay flexible in 
another controversial project, the Nordstream 2 pipeline, 
which is planned to transport Russian gas directly to Ger-
many, bypassing Ukraine. On this issue, Prague is likely 
to take regional considerations into account.
In summary, while the Czech election at first appear 
to confirm anti-EU tendencies in Central Europe, they do 
offer a more varied picture at closer look. While ruptures 
and changes are most likely on the domestic agenda, its 
foreign and EU policies promise more continuity than 
widely assumed. 
Milan Nič is a Senior Fellow at the German Council on 
Foreign Relations (DGAP). 
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in this publication was supported by the Czech-German 
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Andrej Babiš is not Central Europe’s Game-Changer  3 
DGAPstandpunkt  Nr. 15 / October 2017
The opinions expressed in this publication are  
those of the authors and do not necessarily 
reflect the views of the German Council on 
Foreign Relations (DGAP). . 
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